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Industrial loan companies have been a 
part of the ﬁ  nancial landscape for 
the better part of a century, but until 
recently, not many people outside of 
banking circles had heard of them. 
Much like early-twentieth-century 
building and loan associations, which 
ﬁ  lled a void in home loans left by main-
stream ﬁ  nancial institutions, industrial 
loan companies (ILCs) arose to ﬁ  ll a 
void in unsecured consumer lending.
When the ﬁ  rst ILC came into existence 
in 1910, the way it conducted busi-
ness—from its approach to consumer 
lending to the way it funded loans—
was sufﬁ  ciently different from tradi-
tional banks that it and the institutions 
that evolved from it were not consid-
ered to be banks from a legal stand-
point. This legal distinction would keep 
ILCs exempt from certain types of bank 
regulation in later decades. 
When commercial banks ﬁ  nally warmed 
up to the business of unsecured con-
sumer lending in the 1920s and began to 
surpass the ILCs in the market in later 
decades, it seemed as though the ILC 
industry would be relegated to a footnote 
in ﬁ  nancial history. The limited nature of 
the ILC charter placed these institutions 
at a competitive disadvantage to other 
consumer lenders in the market. 
Yet not only have ILCs survived, they 
have begun to grow. At the end of 2004, 
there were 57 ILCs in existence with 
combined assets of $140 billion—up 
from $3.8 billion in 1987—and six of 
these ILCs ranked among the largest 
180 ﬁ  nancial institutions in the nation, 
according to a 2005 GAO report. The 
largest ILC has over $66 billion in 
assets, making it one of the top-25 
commercial banking companies in the 
United States. 
The marked increase in the size of the 
average ILC, the growth of industry’s 
combined assets, and the recent well-pub-
licized applications for ILC charters by 
large commercial ﬁ  rms suggest that these 
institutions are becoming more than niche 
players in ﬁ  nancial markets. Below, we 
take a look at some reasons why. 
  A Short History of ILCs
ILCs emerged from the Morris Plan 
banks of the early twentieth century. 
The name “Morris Plan” comes from a 
Virginia lawyer, Arthur J. Morris, who 
in 1910 began providing loans to low- 
and moderate-income workers who had 
stable jobs but did not have access to 
credit from commercial banks. 
Banks of the time were reluctant to lend 
to these workers because it was difﬁ  cult 
for them to distinguish between work-
ers who were likely to repay their loans 
and those who were not. Such a difﬁ  -
culty can lead to an adverse selection 
problem, where the only people asking 
for loans are the most risky sorts of bor-
rowers. Riskier borrowers should pay a 
higher interest rate than less risky ones, 
but when bankers cannot distinguish 
between the two, they cannot set an 
interest rate that both compensates them 
for the risk they are taking on and is still 
acceptable to all borrowers, both high- 
and low-risk.
Adverse selection can lead to credit 
market failure if banks don’t ﬁ  nd a way 
to tell the types of potential borrowers 
apart. Commercial bankers at the time 
had found a partial solution to the 
problem by relying on the ability of 
workers to post collateral as a loan-
screening device. Safe borrowers 
could post a large amount of collateral 
because they knew they would repay 
the loan and never lose the collateral. 
In return, the bank could charge them a 
low interest rate. High-risk borrowers, 
on the other hand, knew that they might 
very well lose their collateral, and they 
agreed to pay a high interest rate so they 
could post lower collateral.
But most low- and moderate-income 
workers did not have acceptable col-
lateral, and as a result, they could not 
secure credit from a bank. Morris’s 
ingenious solution to the adverse selec-
tion problem did not require collateral. 
Instead, he required the signature of two 
co-signers on a loan, chosen among the 
family and friends of the borrower. This 
business model was based on his now-
conventional belief that pressure from 
friends and family would keep borrow-
ers honest and make them repay their 
loans. At that time, however, it was 
unheard of. 
ILCs created confusion about whether 
or not they were “banks” from day 
one. When Morris applied to the Vir-
ginia Corporation Commission for a 
charter for his institution, he got the 
following reply from the chairman of 
the Commission:
Once Wal-Mart announced its inten-
tion to acquire an industrial loan 
company, a public furor arose that 
has brought a lot of attention to a 
type of institution that has existed 
for quite some time, but was not 
widely recognized outside of banking 
circles. What are ILCs and why have 
they become so controversial lately?Dear Arthur: 
I have carefully considered your 
application for a charter for your 
hybrid and mongrel institution. 
Frankly, I don’t know what it is. It 
isn’t a savings bank; it isn’t a state 
or national bank; it isn’t a charity. It 
isn’t anything I ever heard of before.
The way they made loans was the 
biggest difference between the ILCs 
and banks, but it wasn’t the only one. 
State law prevented the ILCs from 
receiving deposits, but deposits were a 
good way for lenders to ﬁ  nance them-
selves. Morris’s solution to this prob-
lem was to use deposits but to call them 
something different, in this case, “thrift 
certiﬁ  cates.” Even 20 years later, thrift 
certiﬁ  cates were considered to be dif-
ferent from deposits—when the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) was established in 1933, ILCs 
were excluded from deposit insurance 
because, well, they were not allowed to 
accept deposits.
The FDIC’s decision conﬁ  rmed the 
ILCs’ quasi-bank status but also put 
them at a great disadvantage relative to 
commercial banks. Commercial banks 
in New York had begun to make small 
consumer loans in the mid-1920s, and 
after the Great Depression, these banks 
began to dominate consumer lending, 
the previous strength of the ILCs. 
Commercial banks could overtake the 
ILCs in this area mainly because they 
could offer various banking services, 
such as loans and, after 1933, insured-
demand deposits under one roof. 
(Demand deposits are typical checking 
and savings accounts.) 
Even without federally provided deposit 
insurance, the ILCs did not slide into 
oblivion. As they could not compete 
with banks in attracting demand 
deposits, they funded themselves with 
equity, ordinary debt, time-deposits, and 
NOW accounts (which allowed deposi-
tors to withdraw their funds with a 
seven-day advance notice).
This strategy turned out to be their 
salvation. In 1956 new legislation pro-
hibited any afﬁ  liation between com-
mercial entities and banks. And because 
banks are deﬁ  ned as ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions that make commercial loans 
and accept demand deposits, ILCs are 
not prohibited from such afﬁ  liations, 
a stroke of luck which created a new 
niche for these institutions. Because 
ILCs do not accept demand depos-
its, they are not considered banks, and 
they can have commercial afﬁ  liates. 
But while ILC deposits are not demand 
deposits, they have been FDIC-insured 
since 1982, and so the advantage that 
other types of banking institutions had 
over ILCs with respect to FDIC insur-
ance has disappeared as well. Further-
more, ILCs are exempt from bank-hold-
ing company regulation, so companies 
that own an ILC avoid the regulation 
and supervision of agencies that oversee 
bank holding companies. ILCs quickly 
became the takeover targets of commer-
cial entities and investment banks that 
wished to have limited banking powers 
but did not want to bear the burden of 
bank-holding-company regulation.
Over the next four decades, Congress 
passed a number of banking bills that 
further limited the ability of commer-
cial ﬁ  rms to own federally insured 
depository institutions. Today, the ILC 
charter is effectively the only vehicle 
by which nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms can enter 
banking, and by which nonbank ﬁ  nan-
cial ﬁ  rms can own a depository institu-
tion without being subject to holding-
company supervision by the Federal 
Reserve System. 
  The Value of an ILC Charter
Commercial ﬁ  rms have acquired or 
established their own ILCs for vari-
ous reasons. For example, Home Depot 
recently applied to acquire an ILC and 
intends to use it, according to a com-
pany spokesperson, to extend loans to 
contractors. According to the Indepen-
dent Community Bankers of America, 
Merrill Lynch, which owns the largest 
ILC, uses its ILC as a depository for 
the cash balances of its investor clients, 
providing them with the option of hold-
ing some or all of their cash balances in 
FDIC-insured deposits. Toyota uses its 
ILC to offer ﬁ  nancing to customers for 
car purchases. General Motors Corpo-
ration uses its to hold escrow deposits 
associated with its mortgage subsidiary, 
GMAC Mortgage Group. Target uses 
its ILC to issue credit cards to its corpo-
rate customers. Wal-Mart applied for an 
ILC charter in July 2005, and the reason 
it wants an ILC, according to the com-
pany’s head of ﬁ  nancial services, is so 
it can gain access to the system through 
which payments are processed and set-
tled—one area of ﬁ  nancial intermedia-
tion that remains the exclusive domain 
of depository institutions. 
Such access would allow Wal-Mart to 
complete the ﬁ  nal stage of a process 
that takes place when customers pay by 
credit card, debit card, or check—one 
perhaps few customers realize even 
exists—which involves the actual and 
irrevocable transfer of funds from the 
bank accounts of customers to the bank 
account of the merchant. Home Depot, 
Wal-Mart, or any other large retail 
establishment that owned an ILC could 
do the same.
In all these cases, commercial ﬁ  rms can 
potentially save a great deal of money 
by bringing banking services in-house 
rather than paying another institution 
for them. For instance, a retail or dis-
count store might pay 2-3 percent of 
a credit card transaction to the credit 
card company. This 2-3 percent fee 
is divided among the bank issuing 
the credit card, the credit association, 
and what is known as the merchant 
acquirer—that is, the ﬁ  rm that processes 
the payment. Owning an ILC allows 
the store to bring in-house the process-
ing of credit and debit card transactions 
if it can do so at a lower cost than what 
would be paid to the merchant acquirer. 
Given the ﬁ  xed costs of establish-
ing and operating a payment process-
ing center, owning an ILC for payment 
processing purposes may make sense 
only for large companies, which accept 
a large number of payments during the 
ordinary course of business.
How much is access to the payments 
system worth? Quite a bit it would 
seem. In a pair of studies, Tara Rice 
investigated what commercial banks 
earn from their payments-related ser-
vices and found that the top 40 banking 
companies in 2001 derived 16 percent 
of their operating revenue from pay-
ments-related activities and that there 
was a positive and signiﬁ  cant rela-
tionship between the size and scope 
of a bank’s payments-related activi-
ties and the value of the banking com-
pany. While it is difﬁ  cult to sort out 
how much of a bank’s payments-related 
income comes from the processing and 
settlement of credit and debit card trans-
actions and checking account fees (as 
opposed to servicing mortgages or pro-cessing securities trades), there is clear 
value to commercial ﬁ  rms of being able 
to offer products and services that they 
could not provide if they did not have 
access to the payments system. 
  The Future of ILCs
Even though there are potential gains 
associated with allowing commercial 
companies to bring some banking ser-
vices in-house, there are potential prob-
lems with the unique status of the ILCs. 
Like all depository institutions, ILCs 
have access to the federal ﬁ  nancial 
safety net: Their deposits are insured 
by the FDIC, the Federal Reserve guar-
antees the transfers of funds that they 
are allowed to make over its electronic 
network, and they can borrow money 
through the primary lending facilities of 
Federal Reserve Banks. 
But unlike other institutions that have 
access to the federal ﬁ  nancial safety 
net, ILCs are not subject to the same 
level of supervision, on account of their 
exemption from bank-holding-company 
regulations. With bank-holding compa-
nies, supervisory oversight, which is put 
in place to protect the taxpayers who 
ultimately pay for the safety net, applies 
not only to the depository institution but 
also to the parent company and all of its 
afﬁ  liates as well. 
ILCs are supervised by the FDIC, but a 
commercial company that owns an ILC 
is not supervised by any ﬁ  nancial regu-
lator. The owner and its afﬁ  liates are 
subject to regulatory scrutiny only to 
the extent that they have a contractual 
relationship with the ILC. The FDIC 
cannot monitor the business practices 
of the commercial owner or its afﬁ  liates 
to reveal potential risks to the sound-
ness of the entire group or the ILC. In 
contrast, federal regulators have greater 
control over bank-holding companies, 
including the authority to ﬁ  re the man-
agement of a company in the holding 
structure or force divestiture of nonbank 
holding-company afﬁ  liates if the com-
pany policies are putting the soundness 
of the depository institution at risk. 
The unique status of ILCs has recently 
become the subject of much attention, 
including a congressional hearing on 
ILCs on July 12 of this year. Some, 
including the former Federal Reserve 
System chairman Alan Greenspan, 
the current chairman Ben Bernanke, 
and Federal Reserve System General 
Counsel Scott Alvarez, have called for 
changes that would extend the regula-
tions that apply to banks and bank-hold-
ing companies to the ILCs and the com-
panies that own them. Others, including 
the acting general counsel of the FDIC, 
Douglas Jones, question the need to 
change the rules governing ILCs. 
On July 18, 2006, the FDIC announced 
a six-month moratorium on applications 
for deposit insurance for industrial loan 
companies. The moratorium also pro-
hibits changes in control of ILCs dur-
ing the same period. The purpose of the 
moratorium is to allow public comment 
on a wide range of issues surrounding 
ILCs, “including the current legal and 
business framework of ILCs and the 
possible beneﬁ  ts, risks, and supervisory 
issues associated with ILCs.” Policy-
makers and researchers can take the 
opportunity to continue to discuss the 
pros and cons of allowing ILCs to oper-
ate under the current rules or extending 
bank-holding-company regulation and 
supervision to them. At stake is not only 
the unique status of ILCs within the set 
of organizations that are, for all intents 
and purposes, bank-holding companies, 
but also the one means by which com-
mercial enterprises can own banking 
institutions.
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